Market Frictions Versus Seller Signaling: Explaining Deviations from the Law of One Price
Abstract: Market Frictions Versus Seller Signaling: Explaining Deviations from the Law of One Price
Significant price dispersion for homogeneous goods in e-commerce is a well-documented puzzle; we find robust empirical evidence that the puzzle is roughly half as large as previously thought. We use an approach motivated by economic theory, employing a rich new dataset encompassing a wealth of unstructured data from 14 product categories, and flexible machine-learning methods. We quantify sellers' marketing strategies through customization of the content, layout, and appearance of their product-listing web pages. Price variation systematically associated with these observable listing characteristics captures perceived listing heterogeneity rather than pricing noise generated by market frictions, allowing us to bound the role of market frictions in observed price dispersion. We find that seller-customized listing characteristics account for roughly half of observed cross-sectional price dispersion. These characteristics also predict buyer responses, with more information-rich listings associated with higher sale probabilities and shorter listing durations. Thus, a substantial portion of apparent deviations from the Law of One Price reflects economically meaningful differences in how sellers present otherwise physically identical products.